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Abstract
In our paper targets, by setting a reserve price, screen acquirers on their (expected)
ability to generate merger-specific synergies. Both empirical evidence and many common
merger models suggest that the difference between high- and low-synergy mergers becomes
smaller during booms. This implies that the target’s opportunity cost for sorting out rel-
atively less fitting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms,
which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that
merger activity is intense during economic booms and subdued during recessions but is also
consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.
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1 Introduction
The existence of periods of intense merger activity, typically referred to as merger waves,
is well documented (Andrade and Stafford, 2004).1 Merger activity usually heats up in
economic booms and slows down in recessions (see e.g. Maksimovic and Philips, 2001).
Empirical papers point to various exogenous economic factors like technological innova-
tions or demand booms as triggers of merger waves. Economic merger theories predict
that when economic conditions are better, mergers should be more profitable and therefore
more likely to occur (see Harford, 2005, for a discussion of these theories and empirical ev-
idence). These theories, however, do not address a number of stylized facts about mergers.
For example, they do not explain why wave mergers are on average less efficient (Rosen,
2006) or why initiated mergers are more likely to be abandoned during downturns (see
Figure 1).2
We propose a merger screening mechanism that—despite its simplicity—is consistent
with stylized facts about mergers, and provides novel testable predictions. In our model,
the acquirer possesses more information about the synergy gains than the target (as e.g.
in Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The target has less
information on the goodness of fit, but can commit to a reserve price (Cramton, 1998;
Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000; Inderst and Wey, 2004). As argued by Cramton, this may
be done in reality through the use of defense tactics.3 When setting a reserve price, the
target considers the following trade-off: by requesting a high reserve price, it extracts more
1Weston et al. (1990) and Martynova and Renneboog (2005) provide excellent reviews of the literature.
2Figure 1 indicates that during the period 1990-2005 the relative number of merger abandonments in
the US was higher when economic conditions (as measured by quarterly growth in GDP) were worse. The
negative correlation of -0.35 is statistically significant at a 1% level. The figure and correlation are based
on quarterly grouped U.S. data from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database of Thomson Financial,
which provides information on announced M&As valued at $1 million or more.
3More generally, by allowing the target to set a reserve price, we utilize the simplest incomplete
information bargaining model that is consistent with the target having substantial bargaining power.
Practioners and researchers emphasize that—partially due to defense tactics and antitakeover laws—
targets have indeed strong bargaining power in the merger process (see e.g. Fuller et al., 2002).
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merger rents whenever the post-merger synergy gains are high.4 In doing so, however,
the target risks that it cannot sell if the acquirer turns out to be a relatively worse fit.5
The target thus compares the gains of setting a high price—and thereby screening the
acquirers—to setting a low price and selling for certain—i.e. pooling the acquirers.6
We argue that in a boom efficiency gains become relatively less important and, hence,
high-type mergers become more similar to low-type mergers. This raises the opportunity
cost of sorting out relatively inefficient acquirers as their relative value increases. The
target, therefore, sets a reserve price that is acceptable to both high- and relatively low-
type acquirers—leading to a hike in mergers. Thus, an exogenous upward shift in the
economic conditions causes a lack of screening and, as a consequence, a merger “cluster”
or merger “wave”.
Hence, central to our argument is the following: improvements in the economic envi-
ronment make synergy gains relatively less important in the sense that profits of high-
and low-type mergers become relatively more similar. This assumption is in line with
empirical evidence, which indicates that during booms output shares are reallocated from
more-productive to less-productive firms, so that the latter produce relatively more (Lee,
2007; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006). Applying Boone’s (2000, 2007) results on output
reallocation and competition, this suggests that low-type merged firms are punished less
harshly for being inefficient when economic conditions are better, and hence earn profits
4The hostile takeover of Peoplesoft by Oracle in 2004 fits this setup. Oracle launched a bid in February
offering $21 per share. Peoplesoft in response triggered a poison pill and a “Customer Assurance Pro-
gram”, specifying money-back guarantees for customers if PeopleSoft were acquired by Oracle or SAP.
Oracle and Peoplesoft finally agreed in December on a takeover price of $26.5 per share.
5The failed takeover of Salix by Axcan, two Canadian pharmaceuticals, fits this setup. Salix’ share-
holders allowed the use of a poison pill, stating that “Mergers and acquisitions must be considered, but
one thing we cannot do is allow someone to buy us on the cheap.” Axcan initiated a takeover of Salix in
April 2003. Due to Salix’ defense tactics Axcan finally abandoned its attempt in June, although having
raised the bid several times in between.
6The use of defense tactics as a successful screening device is consistent with empirical evidence.
Comment and Schwert (1995), for example, show that defense tactics lead (i) to higher takeover prices
when the takeover takes place, but (ii) also force some acquirers to abandon mergers they had previously
initiated. Of course, however, defense tactics may also be motivated by agency problems.
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that are relatively more similar to those of high types. We also show below that this
assumption is satisfied in most of the commonly used simple horizontal merger models.7
The lack of screening during booms not only helps explain procyclical spikes in merger
activity but also predicts that more efficient acquirers extract higher rents during booms.
This is consistent with recent evidence that in a merger wave bidders gain on average
higher (short term) abnormal returns than bidders outside a wave (Harford, 2003; Gugler
et al., 2006; Rosen, 2006).8 Furthermore, in line with our mechanism, Carow et al. (2004)
find that during waves high-type acquirers earn relatively more from a merger than low-
type acquirers. At the same time, we also explain why, on average, mergers that occurred
in a wave are less efficient than non-wave mergers. Mergers during a baisse should stay
relatively more profitable in the long term, since these are better filtered out by the target.
Indeed, in the long term, wave mergers perform on average significantly worse than non-
wave mergers, as Gugler et al. (2006), Harford (2003) and Rosen (2006) document. In
our model, merged entities may be even less efficient than non-merging firms—consistent
with empirical evidence in Carow et al. (2004).
Other recent theoretical work has made advances in explaining the procyclicality of
merger activity. The first strand, to which we will refer as “economic shock” theories
relies on economic fundamentals. Lambrecht (2004) shows that when merger synergies
7A noteworthy exception is a homogenous-good Cournot model with constant marginal costs in which
a merger can be interpreted as the closure of the less efficient firm. This model provides a rationale for
excess capacity-reducing mergers and can be used to explain merger clustering in troubled industries (see
Fauli-Oller, 2000). A sufficient condition for Cournot models to satisfy our assumption is that mergers
absent efficiency gains are profitable as is often the case with product differentiation or increasing marginal
costs (see Perry and Porter, 1985 and our results below).
8Some of the stylized facts come from the so-called “event-studies”, which measure the stock price
changes after a merger (announcement). They are based on three assumptions (see e.g. Cox and Portes,
1998): (i) the semi-strong version of the “efficient markets hypothesis”, (ii) that merger announcements
are unanticipated, and (iii) that there is no interference by confounding effects. Despite these underlying
assumptions, event studies dominate the empirical research on mergers and acquistions, since they are
less prone to individual bias and arguably rely on less questionable assumptions than valuations produced
through such alternative methods as discounted cash flow analysis or accountancy data.
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are an increasing function of a stochastic product market demand, then each firm’s payoff
from merging has features similar to call options. Firms therefore have an incentive to
merge—exert their option—in periods of economic expansion. Toxvaerd (2004) shows
that if an increase in an economic fundamental increases the number of expected future
mergers, this in turn can induce preemptive mergers today, leading to cluster effects.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that technological shocks may lead to a higher
dispersion of efficiency in an industry. This leads to a reallocation of physical assets from
less efficient targets to more efficient acquirers. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), on
the other hand, predict that mergers occur between firms with similar efficiencies and
complementary assets. Since search costs are lower during economic booms, they predict
that economic booms induce more assortative matching because firms can search longer
for the ideal partner.
The second strand of literature, called “misvaluation” theories, builds on stock market
misvaluations. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that acquirers with temporary overvalued
shares interchange these shares for real assets of undervalued targets, which targets are
willing to accept due to having shorter time horizons. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2004) develop a model of uncertainty about sources of misvaluation. Targets with imper-
fect information will accept more bids from overvalued bidders during market valuation
peaks because they overestimate synergies during these periods. Similar to ours, the
above mentioned theories find pro-cyclical merger clustering. We highlight the observable
differences between our predictions and those of these existing theories in Section 5 below.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model.
Section 3 establishes, based on one potential acquirer per merger-match, our screening
mechanism and provides sufficient conditions and examples. In Section 4, we outline the
case of multiple potential acquirers and derive the optimal selling mechanism when partial
ownership suffices to generate the merger synergies. Section 5 discusses our predictions.
Finally, in Section 6, we conclude. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4
2 Model
We now introduce a simple takeover process in a general model of firm competition. In
the subsection thereafter, we relate the merging profits to the state of the economy.
2.1 A simple takeover process
A given firm, “the acquirer”, is potentially interested in buying another firm, “the target”.9
There are two types of potential acquirers, one that is of good fit—i.e. one that should
be able to realize high synergies from merging with the target (“high type”)—and one
that is less fitting (“low type”).10 Let piH and piL be the post-merger joint profits if the
acquirer is of high and low-type, respectively, with piH > piL. Let piT be the target’s and
piA the acquirer’s profit in the absence of a merger. We denote the net merger gain of a
high-type merger by ∆piH , i.e. ∆piH ≡ piH − (piT + piA). Similarly, let ∆piL be the net
merger gain of a low-type merger.
The acquirer has informational advantages about the profitability of the transaction.
Indeed, having better information is consistent with acquirers being, on average, sub-
stantially larger, older, and more experienced in merger activities than targets (see e.g.
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Furthermore, the acquirer knows better than the target how
much synergies can be realized, since it will be in charge of post-merger operations and
synergy realizations.11 Formally, the common prior probability that the acquirer is of
9Our paper follows much of the literature in assuming that there is an exogenously assigned target and
acquirer(s). (In Section 4 we consider multiple potential acquirers.) While it would be interesting to also
endogenize the choice of the target, we think that the case with an exogenous target is an important and
realistic one, at least in the short term. The rationale behind this assumption is that some firms—the
potential acquiers—are at a point in time higher valued (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan, 2004), more productive (e.g. Fauli-Oller, 2000; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), and/or
better managed (e.g. Lambrecht and Myers, 2007) than others —the potential targets. See Inderst and
Wey (2004) and Toxvaerd (2004) for further motivation of this assumption.
10For ease of exposition, we present the two-type model. Our main insights can be replicated for a
continuous distribution of types.
11Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also introduced acquirer informational
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high type is q ∈ (0, 1). Prior to the merger process, however, the acquirer receives a
more precise signal about whether it is a high- or a low-type acquirer. For simplicity, we
assume the extreme case where the acquirer receives a perfect private signal, while the
target receives no or a completely uninformative signal.
The target, however, extracts information by setting a price, r, at which it is willing
to sell the company. As for example in Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000), Inderst and Wey
(2004), and Pavel and Singh (2006), we thus assume that the target can commit to an
optimal reserve price.12 As Cramton (1998) points out, an implicit reserve price can be
set by employing different defense tactics.13 The use of defense tactics as a successful
screening device is also consistent with empirical evidence. In line with our screening
theory, Comment and Schwert (1995), among others, show that defense tactics lead (i)
to higher takeover prices when the takeover takes place, but (ii) also force some acquirers
to abandon mergers they had previously initiated. Overall, however, takeover defenses
appear to be successful devices: takeover premia are higher on average, even after taking
into account abandonments.14
The timing of the takeover process is as follows. First, the target sets a reserve price at
which it is willing to sell the company. Second, the acquirer either accepts or rejects. If it
accepts, the merger is carried out—i.e. the target receives a payoff of r and the acquirer
obtains the target’s production facility. Otherwise, the merger is abandoned. Finally,
the above specified profits are obtained. Notice that by allowing the target to make a
advantages in takeover models. This informational advantage is often invoked to explain the empirical
finding that acquirers sometimes realize gains from a takeover (see Barney, 1986, for an early discussion).
12Pavel and Singh (2006) assume that one of the potential bidders has superior information about
the target and investigate the optimal selling procedure in this case, which can be implemented as a
sequential auction that may require a reserve price.
13Cramton (1998) states that “A target’s board has a great deal of discretion in establishing proce-
dures...This power arises from the target’s prior issuance of a poison pill... poison pills afford the board
a (limited) ability to set a reserve price.”
14Other commentators, however, have argued that takeover defenses might also be used for the benefit
of the target’s management, while being harmful for its shareholders. See Heron and Lie (2006) for a
recent discussion on this issue.
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take-it-or-leave-it offer, we choose a simple incomplete information bargaining model in
which the target has all the bargaining power in the merger process.15
2.2 Merger gains and economic conditions
Profits from merging, as well as the profits in absence of a merger, depend on the un-
derlying economic conditions (e.g. consumer demands, production costs, etc.). Let the
economic conditions be parameterized by a real variable b ∈ [bmin, bmax] with the interpre-
tation that firms’ profits—with and without a merger—are higher if b is greater. For a
given economic condition b, we denote the high and low-type merger gains as a function
of the economic conditions by ∆piH(b) and ∆piL(b), respectively, with ∆piH(b) and ∆piL(b)
being continuously differentiable and ∆piH(b) > ∆piL(b) for any b.
We next present the two assumptions that drive our main results. They specify a
relation between the net gains from merging and economic conditions in a general frame-
work, without specifying a market model. Below in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we will show
that these conditions are satisfied for a variety of horizontal, conglomerate and vertical
merger models.
Our first condition postulates that net profit differences between high- and low-type
mergers are less pronounced when economic conditions are better.
Assumption 1 The ratio between the net merger gains of a high-type merger and a low-
type merger decreases as the economic condition b becomes better. Whenever ∆piL(b) 6= 0,
∂
∂b
∆piH(b)
∆piL(b)
< 0. (1)
Empirical evidence suggests that this condition is satisfied in practice. In economic
downturns (i) the more efficient firms produce a relatively higher share of total output
(Lee, 2007), and (ii) the total factor productivity rates are more dispersed (Eisfeldt and
15Defense tactics enhance the bargaining power of the target with respect to the acquirers, as practi-
tioners and researchers have long acknowledged. As for example Fuller et al. (2002) state “In the 1980s,
takeover defenses adopted by firms, state antitakeover laws, and judicial decisions protecting targets all
developed to further shift the bargaining balance from bidders to targets.”
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Rampini, 2006).16 An increased output dispersion in downturns in favor of the more effi-
cient firms is also consistent with the so-called “cleansing effect” of downturns, predicted
by, among others, Caballero and Hammour (1994).
Boone (2000, 2007) shows that firms are punished more harshly for being inefficient in
more “competitive markets”, which he defines as markets with more output reallocation.
In particular, Boone (2000) shows in a number of specific horizontal market models that
the relative profits of an efficient firm with respect to a less efficient firm are increas-
ing in the level of reallocation. Boone (2007) then shows in a general framework that
the relative profit differences of an efficient firm and a less efficient firm—with respect
to a third firm in the industry—are also increasing in the level of reallocation. Given
that more output reallocation coincides with worsening economic conditions (Lee, 2007;
Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006), our condition can be viewed as adopting Boone’s (2007)
result to a merger context. That is, we postulate that the net profits of a (hypothetical)
high-type merger increases relative to those of a (hypothetical) low-type merger when
the economic conditions become worse—consistent with the observation that relatively
more output is reallocated towards high-type firms when economic conditions are worse.
This reallocation effect is reinforced if mergers involve significant, mainly fixed up-front
restructuring costs,17 which also work in favor of Assumption (1).18
Our second condition states that if a given merger is profitable for a certain economic
condition, then it is strictly profitable when economic conditions are better. Since the
16Lee (2007, p1) states that: “Output shares are reallocated from less-productive to more-productive
plants during recessions, so that during recessions, less productive firms produce less of the total output,
but during expansions they produce more.” Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006, p371) furthermore state that:
“Our finding of countercyclical productivity dispersion across firms and sectors adds to the empirical
support for increases in heterogeneity in recessions.”
17Lambrecht (2004), for example, highlights that mergers involve significant one-of costs, such as legal
fees, fees to investment banks and other merger promoters, and the costs of restructuring and integrating
the two companies (see also Houston et al., 2001).
18To see this, abstract from the reallocation effect and suppose that merger profits absent the fixed
up-front restructuring costs R are positive and proportional to the economic condition b for both types,
i.e. ∆pij(b) = b(∆pij(bmin) +R)−R for j ∈ {L,H}. In this case Assumption (1) holds whenever R > 0.
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high-type is always more profitable than the low-type merger, the condition can be stated
in terms of the high-type merger.
Assumption 2 If a high type merger is profitable, ∆piH(b) ≥ 0, for a given economic
condition b, then it is strictly profitable for any economic condition b′ > b.
In contrast to the “economic shock” theories that we discuss in the introduction, in our
model it is unnecessary that the net gains from merging are increasing in the economic
condition. As we will show in the next section, it is not even necessary that better
economic conditions make previously unprofitable mergers profitable.
3 Screening and merger clusters
3.1 The screening mechanism
We now explain how the “bare bones” of our screening mechanism work, using Assumption
(1) and a sufficient condition for Assumption (2); namely, we assume that all mergers
are profitable. This highlights the two main differences between our framework and the
economic shock theories. First, in our mechanism, some profitable mergers are abandoned.
Second, it is unnecessary that mergers become more profitable as the economic conditions
improve.
Proposition 1 If Assumption (1) is satisfied and mergers are profitable for any economic
condition, i.e. ∆piL(b) ≥ 0 for any b, then there exists b ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that if b < b
only high-type mergers take place, whereas if b > b all mergers take place.
Although mergers involving both type of acquirers are profitable, the target might set
a reserve price that does not accommodate low-type acquirers. By screening the acquirer
through a “high reserve price”, the target can extract all post-merger efficiency gains if it,
indeed, meets a high-type acquirer. But, by doing so, the target risks that the takeover
will be abandoned because low-type acquirers are unwilling to pay such a high reserve
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price. On the other hand, to ensure that the takeover gets consummated, the target needs
to set a “low reserve price”, which all types of acquirers are willing to accept.
If the economic conditions are “bad”, b < b, the merger gains with a low-type acquirer
are small and, hence, the opportunity cost of setting a high price is low. The target thus
screens acquirers when the economic conditions are sufficiently bad. As the economic
conditions become better, high- and low-type mergers become more similar (Assumption
1). Setting a price that is also acceptable to low-type acquirers becomes therefore more
and more attractive as lower types become relatively more similar to higher types. Thus,
above a critical economic condition, b > b, the target strictly prefers to set a pooling
reserve price. This has two immediate implications. As the economic conditions improve,
targets become less selective and, hence, also merge with acquirers when synergy gains
are lower. Also, because better economic conditions (b > b) imply less screening, the
(average) reserve price is lower than if the target had complete information about the
potential synergy gains.
In a second step, using assumptions (1) and (2), we present our main result, which
accommodates a “full” wave—i.e. an increase from no merger activity to maximum merger
activity when economic conditions improve.
Proposition 2 If Assumptions (1) and (2) are satisfied, there exist b and b ∈ [bmin, bmax]
such that if b < b no merger takes place, if b < b < b only high-type mergers take place,
and if b > b all mergers take place.
Thus, our screening model predicts that as economic conditions improve target firms
set a reserve price such that no, some or all acquirers find it acceptable. At first, for
bad economic conditions, mergers are unprofitable and, hence, any merger would involve
losses for either the target or the acquirer, or both. The target sets a reserve price that
is unacceptably high for any acquirer. For better economic conditions, the target sets a
separating and for even better conditions a pooling reserve price. Thus, we have a full
model of merger waves.
The proposed screening mechanism is consistent with the fact that relatively more
mergers are abandoned during relatively worse economic conditions (see Figure 1). An
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acquirer, with positive information about an eventual merger, might approach a potential
target. But the latter—e.g. by using defense tactics—sets a reserve price that is too high
for a low-type acquirer. In contrast, when the economic conditions are better, the reserve
price is chosen such that all potential acquirers find it acceptable. This predicts not only
more mergers but also that less previously initiated mergers are abandoned.19
3.2 Market power and efficiency gains: conditions and examples
We have already argued that Assumptions (1) and (2) are consistent with the empirical
findings on the intensity of competition during booms and recessions. We now decompose
the gains from horizontal mergers into those from enhanced market power and those from
efficiency gains. This decomposition allows us to derive simple sufficient conditions, which
are naturally satisfied by a wide variety of oligopolistic merger models and ensure that
Assumptions (1) and (2) hold.
Define the hypothetical profits of a merged firm if there were no efficiency gains or
losses as piN . Then one can decompose the net profits of a horizontal merger into efficiency
and market power gains, ∆piH = ∆piE,H + ∆piM , where ∆piE,H ≡ piH − piN and ∆piM ≡
piN−(piT+piA); and with equivalent definitions ∆piL = ∆piE,L+∆piM . Suppose throughout
this subsection that the high-type merger generates efficiency gains ∆piE,H > 0, but that
the low-type leads to either efficiency gains or losses. The following corollary provides
sufficient conditions for Assumptions (1) and (2).
Corollary 1 Assumptions (1) and (2) are satisfied if (3a) ∆piM(b) > 0 ∀b and if the
following two ratios are decreasing for better economic conditions b, at least one of them
strictly; i.e. whenever defined,
(3b)
∂
∂b
∆piE,H(b)
∆piE,L(b)
≤ 0 and (3c)
∂
∂b
∆piE,H(b)
∆piM(b)
≤ 0.
Assumption (2) is trivially satisfied because positive efficiency gains ∆piE,H > 0 to-
gether with market power gains (3a) make the high-type merger always profitable. Suf-
19As argued in Section 5, a more direct empirical test of our proposed mechanism would be to ask
whether defense tactics are indeed employed more often when economic conditions are relatively worse.
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ficient conditions for (1) can be obtained by comparing the relationship between the
economic cycle and the relative importance of efficiency gains and market power gains.
In particular, Condition (3b) tells us that the efficiency gains of a low-type merger in-
crease relative to a high-type merger for better economic conditions (despite always being
lower). Thus, whether one merges with a high or a low type matters relatively less during
booms. Condition (3c) tells us that profits from efficiency gains become relatively less
important than profits from market power. Both ratios together, therefore, state that
when economic conditions improve, it becomes less important to merge with the most
efficient firm.
We now present some merger models that satisfy the conditions of the corollary and
provide counterexamples. In particular, we first show that several models of price com-
petition satisfy the sufficient conditions of our corollary. We then show that for a simple
model of conjectural variations condition (3b) is always satisfied, while conditions (3a)
and (3c) are satisfied as long as market power gains are positive. As a special case we
establish a counterexample: if firms compete in a homogenous good market a` la Cournot
with constant marginal cost condition (3c) is violated and, in fact, also Assumption (1)
is violated. We finally, however, establish that if absent efficiency gains a merger is prof-
itable in a Cournot environment, the conditions of the corollary hold. For each example in
this section, we give details of (i) the market model, (ii) the impact of the merger process,
and (iii) the economic conditions in the model (our general variable b). All claims related
to the examples are proven in the Appendix B.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) argue that merger models based on price competi-
tion with differentiated good can explain observed horizontal merger activity. We begin
our discussion of horizontal merger models with their classic setup. This setup satisfies
conditions (3a), (3b) and (3c).
Example 1 Bertrand with differentiated goods (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985): (i)
Consider an industry with n single-product firms competing in prices and producing, at
constant and identical unit costs c, differentiated products where the demand for firm i is
given by xi =
1
n
(
υ − pi(1 + γ) +
γ
n
Σnj=1pj
)
, where υ > c and γ ≥ 0, which represents the
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degree of substitutability between the n products.20 (ii) Consider a bilateral merger that
reduces the marginal costs of the merging firms to a proportion eH or eL of the pre-merger
level, depending upon whether the merger is a good or a bad fit, where eH < eL < 1. (iii)
Suppose that the economic condition b is parameterized by the common intercept of the
individual demand functions.
We next consider other forms of competition than price competiton. We continue with
a stylized (behavioral) model of horizontal competition with differentiated products that
satisfies conditions (3a), (3b) and (3c).
Example 2 Conjectural variations with market power gains (Kwoka, 1989): (a) Consider
an industry with n single-product firms producing, at constant and identical unit costs c,
differentiated products where the inverse demand for firm i is given by pi = M − Σ
n
j=1qj
where M > c. Suppose that the sum of the rivals’ reactions to an increase in a firm’s
quantity (i.e. the ith firm’s conjectural variation with respect to the rest of the indus-
try, Σnj=1,j 6=i
∂qj
∂qi
) is constant across firms and denoted by V . Firms’ conjectural variations
range from −1 to (n − 1). A conjectural variation of −1 represents a competitive en-
vironment; regardless of the number of firms present, each expects an “accommodating”
output response from the rest of the industry. Hence, each is induced to produce up to
the point where price equals marginal cost. At the other extreme, the fully collusive result
emerges with a conjecture of (n− 1). This represents the anticipation that the remaining
firms will fully match output changes by a particular firm. These extremes bracket among
others the Cournot case, where V = 0. In this familiar example, output may vary from
the monopoly level (when n = 1) to the competitive outcome (when n increases without
limit). (ii) Consider a bilateral merger that reduces the marginal costs of the merging
firms to either c < c or c¯ > c. Firms’ behavior—given by V—remains identical after
the merger. Finally, suppose that mergers are profitable absent efficiency gains, i.e. that
1 + 2(n + V ) − (n+ V )2 > 0.21 (iii) The economic condition b is parameterized by the
common intercept of the individual demand functions or the stand-alone marginal cost c,
20This demand function can be obtained from a quasi-linear utility function (see Motta, 2004).
21For n = 2, a merger without efficiencies is always profitable (indeed V ≤ n− 1 = 1). For n = 3, the
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in which case b = −c and 0 < c = c− k1 = c− k1 − k2 < M, for some positive constants
k1 and k2.
The assumption that mergers absent efficiency gains are profitable is not innocuous
however. For example, the Cournot competition is a special case of the above setup and,
as demonstrated in Salant et al. (1983) for n ≥ 3, a bilateral merger absent efficiency
gains is unprofitable in this model. Indeed, neither our screening conditions nor Assump-
tions (1) and (2) are satisfied in this particular Cournot merger model in which—as first
demonstrated by Fauli-Oller (2000)—merger activity coincides with low demand.
Example 3 Cournot model with homogenous goods (Fauli-Oller, 2000): (i) Consider an
industry with 3 firms competing in quantities and producing, at constant and identical
unit costs c, homogeneous products where the inverse demand for firm i is given by pi =
M − bΣnj=1qj where M > c. (ii) Suppose that there is a single bilateral merger, which
reduce the merging firms marginal costs to c < c or c¯ > c. (iii) Suppose that the economic
conditions are parameterized by the common intercept of the individual demand functions.
As the above counterexample illustrates, if firms compete a la Cournot, merger waves
due to less screening may not coincide with better economic conditions.22 If, however, due
to convexities in the cost function or product differentiation, mergers that do not induce
efficiency gains are profitable in Cournot setup, then conditions (3a), (3b) and (3c) hold
as we illustrate in the next two examples. As noted by Perry and Porter (1985), increasing
marginal costs (or product differentiation) are crucial for yielding sensible descriptions of
previous equation is only satisfied if V < 0.58 and it is never satisfied for n = 4 or more (see also Kwoka,
1989).
22The most common interpretation of the “constant-marginal-cost” Cournot merger model is that the
merger leads to the closure of the less efficient merger participant (see Perry and Porter, 1985). From
this perspective, Fauli-Oller (2000) provides a rationale for elimination of excess capacity in declining
industries. A case study of Dutz (1989) and casual evidence in Lambrecht and Myers (2007) indicate
that this has occurred in some particular troubled industries. The systematic evidence on merger waves,
however, clearly indicates that merger activity is on average highly procycliclal (see e.g. Gugler et al,
2006).
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mergers in a Cournot framework. In contrast to Example 3, the new entity can produce
with a better technology then either of the merging firms in the Perry and Porter model
because it combines the assets of the merging firms. Creating a single firm that owns
the capital of the merging firms is equivalent to setting up a new entity that manages
the forming firms as plants and has therefore lower marginal costs. In contrast, in a
model with constant or decreasing average costs, possibly varying across firms, mergers
would lead to the shutdown of all but one plant(s), which is almost never observed in
real mergers. Similarly, in the differentiated products interpretation, the merged entity
could produce several differentiated products rather than a single homogeneous good as
firms absent a merger do, and thus a merger changes the production technology (Vives,
2002). As the following two examples illustrate, plausible Cournot merger models satisfy
Conditions (3a), (3b) and (3c).
Example 4 Differentiated Cournot model with market power gains: (i) Consider an
industry with n firms competing in quantities and producing, at constant and identical
unit costs c, differentiated products where the inverse demand for firm i is given by pi =
β−(1+ λ
2
)qi−Σj 6=iqj where β > c and λ represents the (symmetric) degree of differentiation
between the products. (ii) Consider a bilateral merger that reduces the merging firms
marginal cost to either c¯ < c or c < c¯ < c. Finally, suppose that the product differentiation
is sufficiently high so that mergers are profitable absent efficiency gains. (iii) The common
intercept of the individual demand functions β parameterizes the economic condition.
Example 5 Cournot model with increasing marginal costs and market power gains (Perry
and Porter, 1985): The above differentiated product model can be reinterpreted as a
Cournot market with homogeneous goods and increasing marginal costs. Following Perry
and Porter (1985), suppose marginal cost curves are linear and strictly increasing,MCi(qi) =
c + λqi. Then profits of a single-plant firm i can be rewritten as pii =
(
β − Σnj=1qj
)
qi −(
c+ λ
2
qi
)
qi, and the analysis is equivalent to the one with differentiated products. Finally,
we suppose that the cost functions are sufficiently convex so that mergers are profitable
absent efficiency gains.
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We now discuss a simple, but fairly general, multi-product setup that satisfies condi-
tions (3a), (3b) and (3c) in which we realistically assume that a merger involves up-front
restructuring costs. A special case of this example, Salop (1979)’s circular-city model with
quadratic transportation costs was analyzed in an earlier version of this paper (Banal-
Estan˜ol et al. 2006).
Example 6 Multiplicative demand with synergies (i) Consider a differentiated-product
industry with n-multi-product firms that compete in prices. Let Dl(p, S) = SDl(p) be
the demand for a product l for a given price vector p and market size S ∈ [S, S], where
we without loss of generality normalize S = 1. Let cl be the marginal cost of producing
good l. Let I denote the set of products produced by i and J denote the set of products
produced by firm j. Suppose—as will be the case for a well-behaved demand system—that
absent a merger there is a unique equilibrium price vector p of the market game in which
firm i’s profits are pii(p
∗, S) =
∑
l∈I(p
∗
l − cl)Dl(p
∗, S). (ii) Consider a bilateral merger
between firms i and j that requires fixed restructuring costs R > 0 and leads to a vector
of marginal costs that is either c ∈ RIxJ+ or c ∈ R
IxJ
+ . Suppose furthermore—as will be
the case for a well behaved demand system—that there exists a unique equilibrium price
vector following a merger. Without loss of generality, suppose that the merged firm’s
profits are higher for the realization of marginal costs c, i.e. piH(p∗,H , S) > piL(p∗,L, S).
Suppose that mergers are profitable, i.e. piL(p∗,L, S) > pii(p
∗, S) + pij(p
∗, S), which absent
changes in marginal costs is typically the case in a differentiated price competition model.
Finally, we impose that after a hypothetical merger that requires restructuring costs R but
leaves marginal cost unchanged, there exists a unique equilibrium price vector for which
the merged firm’s profits are lower than when the marginal cost vector changes to c, i.e. for
which piN(p∗, S) < piH(p∗, S).This generalizes the idea of synergy gains to a multi-product
environment.23 (iii) Here, the market size S parameterizes the economic condition b.
23Of course, it is unnecessary that the marginal cost vector c has component-wise lower marginal costs
than c to satisfy this condition. Interestingly, if one relaxes the assumption that there are synergy gains
after a high-type merger—i.e. suppose that even a high-type merger leads to an increase in marginal costs
but mergers are profitable due to market power gains– then this example would violate the conditions of
the corollary but it would nevertheless satisfy Assumptions (1) and (2).
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We next summarize which horizontal market models satisfy the conditions of our
general screening setup.
Proposition 3 The horizontal market models introduced in Examples 1, 2, 4, 5, and
6 satisfy conditions (3a), (3b) and (3c), and therefore Assumptions (1) and (2). As a
consequence, in these horizontal merger models there is less screening and higher merger
activity during economic booms (i.e. for a higher b).
Let us give an intuitive explanation of which qualitative features of market competition
coincide with our main Assumption (1). Better economic conditions enlarge the size of
the market, i.e. the “pie”, to be distributed between competitors. Both the merged
firm—whether low or high type—and the outsiders to this merger gain more during better
economic conditions. Of course, high-type mergers gain a larger share of this pie than low-
type mergers. What does potentially change with better economic conditions, however,
is how much larger a high-type piece of the pie would be relative to a low-type piece
of the pie. This change in distribution is determined by outsiders’ changing reaction
towards the merger. In response to better economic conditions, they may either react more
aggressively—“agressive” being defined by increasing production or decreasing prices in
response to a merger—or react more softly—“soft” being defined as decreasing production
or increasing prices in response to a merger. A more aggressive response during better
economic conditions makes relative merger efficiencies more important and thus high-
and low-type mergers more different, while a softer response by outsiders makes them less
important, in which case Assumption (1) tends to be satisfied.
The responses by outsiders are in turn determined by the type of competition prevailing
in the market. First, in the case of price competition (Example 1), when the pie is
larger outsiders increase prices more and thus react more softly in response to a merger.
Second, in the case when firms compete “fiercely” in quantities, which is the case for
homogenous products and constant marginal costs (Example 2), a larger pie induces
outsiders to increase production more and thus react more aggressively in response to a
merger. If, instead, the merging firms are sufficiently insulated from competitors—due to
firms competing in quantities with differentiated products (Example 3) or facing increasing
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marginal costs (Example 4)—a merger induces a relatively less aggressive response from
outsiders.
Third, if outsiders react in the same way towards a merger when the pie becomes larger
(Example 5), the relative shares for high- and low-type mergers remain constant across
changing economic conditions. But, under the realistic assumption that mergers involve
fixed restructuring costs, relative net profits become more similar for better economic
conditions. Indeed, fixed restructuring costs always work in favor of Assumption (1).24
3.3 Non-horizontal merger models
We next consider a conglomerate and a vertical merger example. In these non-horizontal
merger examples only efficiency gains play a role and it is straightforward to establish
that Assumptions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Thus, we would expect our results to hold for
non-horizontal mergers as well.
To begin with, consider the common case in which firms merge across independent (say
geographical) markets. Furthermore, suppose realistically that combining the merging
firms involves up-front restructuring costs. In this case, Assumptions (1) and (2) will
typically be satisfied as the following example, which always satisfies these assumptions,
illustrates.
Example 7 Conglomerate merger: (i) Initially, both firms (target and acquirer) operate
in separate local markets with, say, linear (inverse) demand (p = β − ax), and constant
marginal costs c, where β > c. (ii) A merger leads to efficiency gains (i.e. a reduction
in the marginal cost c), but requires a fixed up-front restructuring cost R > 0. These
24Denoting the merging gains from a high- and low-type merger gross of fixed restructuring costs R by
∆piH(b) and ∆piL(b), one has
∂
∂b
(
∆piH(b)−R
∆piL(b)−R
)
=
(
∂
∂b
∆piH(b)
∆piL(b)
)
∆piL(b)
∆piL(b)−R
+
(
∂
∂b
R
∆piL(b)
)(
∆piH(b)
∆piL(b)
− 1
)(
∆piL(b)
∆piL(b)−R
)2
.
If the relative gross gains are constant, the relative net gains are decreasing since the first term in the
second summand is negative and the other two are positive. For the same reason, even if the relative
gross gains are positive, the relative net gains can be negative.
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efficiency gains can be either low, leading to post-merger marginal costs c < c, or high,
leading to c < c. (iii) Suppose that the economic conditions b are parameterized by the
demand intercept, i.e. b = β or the stand-alone marginal cost c, i.e. b = −c and 0 < c =
c− k1 = c− k1 − k2 < β, for some positive constants k1 and k2.
Next, consider a variant of the classical vertical merger model with unknown synergy
gains. As the following example demonstrates such a model also satisfies Assumptions
(1) and (2).
Example 8 Vertical merger: (i) Initially, there are two firms—an upstream firm U and a
downstream firm D. The downstream firm produces the final product for consumers, using
one unit of the upstream firm’s product to produce one unit of output. We assume that the
upstream firm produces its output at constant marginal cost c and that the only costs of
the downstream firm are the payments made to the upstream firm. The upstream firm sets
a (linear) price pU at which it sells its output to the downstream firm. After observing pU ,
the downstream firm sets a price pD to final consumers. The demand in the downstream
market is x = β−pD, where the demand intercept β > c. (ii) Suppose the downstream firm
is the (potential) target while the upstream firm is the (potential) acquirer. The acquirer
can be a high-type acquirer—in which case the post-merger marginal cost are c—or a low-
type acquirer with marginal cost c, where we assume that c ≥ c > c. (iii) Suppose that
the economic conditions are parameterized by the demand intercept or the stand-alone
marginal cost c as in Example 7.
We now briefly extend our model to show its robustness.
4 Extensions
4.1 Multiple Bidders
As mentioned before, Andrade et al. (2001) describe the prototypical takeover in the
1990s as a transaction with one publicly bidding firm. More recently, however, Boone and
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Mulherin (2007) report that around half of the 400 transactions in their 1990s sample were
privately auctioned among multiple bidders prior to the public announcement of takeover
bids. In this section we extend our model to accommodate multiple bidders.
Boone and Mulherin (2007) also find that the choice between a negotiation with a
single bidder and an auction with multiple bidders depends on the “information costs”
of organising an auction. Indeed, the costs of giving away confidential information to
multiple bidders may sometimes outweight the higher revenues from setting up an auction.
Industry factors such as the level of R&D and product standardisation, for instance, are
important determinants of these information costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). As a
result, selling firms in industries such as banking, electricity and telecommunications
are reluctant to set auctions. Here, motivated by evidence and simplicity,25 we take
the number of potential bidders as an exogenous (i.e. industry-specific) factor that is
independent of the economic conditions.
Suppose there are n potential bidders and that the efficiency gains from a merger
are independently distributed across the potential bidders. As before, let q again be the
probability that a given (potential) bidder is of good fit in which case efficiencies are high
and post-merger profits are piH(b). With the complementary probability, efficiencies are
low and post-merger profits are piL(b) < piH(b). Absent being involved in a merger, poten-
tial bidders earn piA(b) and the potential target earns piT (b). This assumption, of course,
rules out externalities between the bidders. Such externalities would arise naturally if
both potential acquirers and the target compete in the same industry—a case we consider
afterwards.
For simplicity, we model the takeover process as a second-price sealed-bid auction with
a publicly known reserve price, which is set by the target. We focus on equilibria in which
25The proportion of auctions and negotiations in Boone and Mulherin’s (2007) sample for example is
constant over time, despite containing the recession of the early 1990s and the economic boom of the
mid to end 1990s. The number of initiated takeovers, instead, increases five-fold from 1989 to 1998,
consistent with other empirical evidence. Unfortunately, Boone and Mulherin (2007) do not report how
the distribution of withdrawn/completed takeovers changes over time, only that 23 out of a total of 400
takeover attempts are withdrawn in their sample.
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bidders use weakly undominated bidding strategies in all bidding subgames and, thus,
bid their net value of a merger (i.e. piH(b) − piA(b) if being a high efficiency type and
piL(b) − piA(b) if being a low type) whenever this net value is greater than the reserve
price.26
As before, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the optimal reserve price is either a
“pooling reserve price”,27 rp ≤ piL(b) − piA(b), which ensures that a sale takes place; a
separating reserve price, rs = piH(b)−piA(b), which extracts all the rents from a high-type
bidder; or a prohibitive reserve price at which no bidder is willing to submit a bid. A
prohibitive reserve price remains optimal if and only if a high-type merger is unprofitable.
Having multiple potential bidders affects now whether a separating or a pooling reserve
price is optimal. But, as shown in the next proposition, this does not alter the comparative
statics results of our main result.
Proposition 4 Consider the case with n potential bidders and no bidding externalities.
If Assumptions (1) and (2) are satisfied, there exist b and b(n) ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that if
b < b, no merger takes place, if b < b < b(n), only high-type mergers take place, and if
b > b(n), all mergers take place.
This result allows us to investigate how the thresholds are related to the market
conditions via the number of potential bidders. First, b does not depend on the number
of potential bidders. When the high-type merger becomes profitable, the target sets the
reserve price such that all high types would accept. The choice between separating or
pooling, however, depends on the number of potential bidders. There are two effects at
play. First, the higher the number of potential bidders, the lower the probability that all of
these are of low type; thus, the probability of being able to sell when setting a separating
26Of course, if firms are modeled as being active in a market game following the bidding stage, the
usual argument about weakly dominated strategies needs to be augmented to one in which bidders use
subgame perfect strategies, which are weakly undominated in the “reduced game”.
27In this case it is unnecessary to set a reserve price because absent a reserve price bidders bid at least
piL(b)− piA(b) in equilibrium. Therefore—although our terminology might suggest otherwise—we do not
predict the use or threat of defence tactics in this case.
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price increases with the number of potential bidders. This effect induces the separating
threshold b(n) to decrease with a higher number of potential bidders. Second, the higher
the number of potential bidders, the higher the probability that two potential bidders are
high type, which would lead to a beneficial bidding war if a pooling reserve price is set.
This effect tends to increase the threshold b(n) for a higher number of potential bidders.
The first effect, however, dominates the second. Intuitively, the possibility of not selling
with a separating reserve price is only relevant if all bidders are of low type, whereas a
pooling price induces no bidding war both when all bidders are low type and when all
but one are of low type. Since the probability of having no bidding war is reduced more
slowly as n increases, separating becomes more attractive.
Corollary 2 Consider the case with n potential bidders and no bidding externalities. For
interior thresholds (bmin < b, b(n) < bmax), b and b(n) are implicitly defined through
∆piH(b) = 0 and
∆piH(b(n))
∆piL(b(n))
=
1− q + nq
nq
.
While b is independent of n, b(n) is increasing in n.
The more potential bidders there are, the longer a target waits to switch from a
screening to a pooling reserve price when economic conditions improve. This result has a
perhaps surprising and noteworthy feature. There exist certain economic conditions for
which the target would prefer to attract a bid from each of a given number of potential
bidders—set a pooling and sell for sure—but only from the high types if there were a
higher number potential bidders—set a separating and potentially not sell the firm. It
may therefore be that for certain economic conditions a higher number of potential bidders
leads to a lower number of completed deals. Thus, there is no straightforward relation
between the number of potential bidders and the number of completed deals.
So far we have assumed that each target has an independent pool of bidders at its
disposal, thereby ignoring competition for high-type acquirers. Some acquirers, however,
may also be interested in other targets, inducing targets to compete for them. Suppose, for
simplicity, that two targets face three potential acquirers, which with a given independent
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probability are an equally good fit with both targets and with the complementary proba-
bility are an equally low fit with both targets. As before, think of the takeover market as a
second-price sealed-bid auction in which targets simultaneously set reserve prices and fo-
cus on equilibria in which acquirers use weakly undominated strategies for any given pair
of reserve prices. If high-type mergers are unprofitable, targets will select a prohibitive
reserve prices. If high-type mergers are profitable but low-type mergers unprofitable, the
targets will select reserve prices that accommodate only high-type mergers. In equilib-
rium, however, targets cannot select the separating price piT (b) +∆piH(b) because then a
target could minimally undercut its rival and ensure a sale in case there is only a single
high-type bidder. Thus, in equilibrium targets choose a reserve price distribution. Both
targets must, indeed, select a non-degenerate pricing distribution up to a critical economic
condition b above which both targets setting the pooling price becomes an equilibrium.
The only difference to before is that now we cannot rule out that targets may put some
positive mass also on the pooling price below the critical economic condition b inducing
only partial screening. Our main insights and predictions, however, carry over to this
case also. Also, if the competition between targets becomes to fierce—e.g if there were
two targets and only one potential bidder—than Bertrand-type reasoning implies that
targets set a serve price piT (b) and all profitable mergers occur. More generally, however,
as long as the number of potential bidders outnumbers the number of potential targets,
we hypothesis that our mechanism still holds: for bad enough economic conditions, no
merger occurs, for intermediate conditions targets (partially and competitively) screen,
and for high enough economic conditions, all targets prefer to set a pooling reserve price.
Our consideration of multiple bidders so far has abstracted from externalities between
the potential acquirers. Takeover games with product market externalities are subtle (see
the pioneering work by Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000) and have been extensively discussed
in the merger literature.28 We will briefly identify some conditions under which our
analysis extends to the case of product market externalities focusing again on the case of
28Even absent screening considerations, the literature identified equilibria in which profitable mergers
do not occur (see Inderst and Wey, 2004) due to free-rider problems as well as other cases in which
unprofitable mergers occur (see Molnar, 2003 and Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2005).
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a single target.
Consider first the case of negative externalities between bidders. For simplicity, we
focus on the symmetric single-product version of the multiplicative demand example pre-
sented in the previous section (Example 6), which satisfied Assumptions (1) and (2).
Absent a merger, denote again the reduced form equilibrium profits of the product mar-
ket game by piT (b) for the target, and by piA(b) for the acquirers, which are now symmetric.
Following a merger with a high-type acquirer, denote the merged firms profits by piH(b)
and the outsider’s profits by pioH(b). Define pi
L(b) and pioL(b) similarly, and observe that
since a high-type merger has lower marginal costs, piH(b) > piL(b) and pioH(b) < pi
o
L(b).
Negative externalities between bidders are introduced by assuming that an outsider’s
profits fall if the merger takes place (i.e. piA(b) > pioL(b)). This occurs if the synergies are
so high that the post-merger equilibrium involves lower prices.29
As compared to the case of no externalities, acquirers have a higher willingness to
pay for the target since becoming an outsider is now worse. This entices acquirers to
submit higher bids, increasing the revenues for the target, both if it sets a pooling or
a separating reserve price (the prohibitive reserve price is suboptimal since mergers are
always profitable). Indeed, suppose first that the target sets a pooling reserve price.
Then both bidders realize that a merger will take place and the bidding process simply
determines whether they will be an insider or an outsider. Since the value of wining is less
for a low-type bidder, she will bid less than a high-type bidder. In equilibrium, a low type
will never overbid a high type. Hence, a low type will bid the difference in value between
winning and receiving the merged firm’s profits and receiving the outsider’s profits when
her rival is a low-type bidder, i.e. piL(b) − pioL(b). Similarly, a high-type bidder will bid
piH(b)− pioH(b) in a symmetric equilibrium. This is of course larger than in the case of no
externalities, in which they would bid piL(b)− piA(b) and piH(b)− piA(b), respectively.
In the case in which the target sets a separating reserve price, not only the bids but
29In this case a merger would increase the consumer surplus. From a legal perspective, antitrust
authorities in the US and Europe should allow horizontal mergers only if they increase consumer surplus.
Hence, focusing on negative externalities can be justified by the assumption that antitrust authorities
and courts make appropriate merger control decisions. Obviously, however, this is a strong assumption.
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also the reserve price might be higher. Indeed, suppose that a bidder expects her rival to
bid if and only if she is a high-type bidder. Then she is willing to submit a bid as long as
piH(b)− r ≥ qpioH(b) + (1− q)pi
A(b), and in this case the optimal separating reserve price
is r = q[piH(b)− pioH(b)] + (1− q)[pi
H(b)− piA(b)]. This is of course larger than the reserve
price in the no externalities case, which was equal to piH(b)− piA(b). In the following, we
will focus on such equilibria with “aggressive-bidding beliefs”.30
As shown in the next proposition, if one compares the target revenues in both cases,
there exists again a critical level of the economic condition above which the target prefers
a pooling reserve price and below which it prefers a separating reserve price. This thus
establishes that better economic conditions lead to higher merger activity.
Proposition 5 Consider the case with negative externalities and two bidders that have
aggressive-bidding beliefs. Suppose that all firms produce a single differentiated good and
compete in prices in a market with multiplicative demand in which, despite restructuring
costs, mergers are profitable. Then there exists b ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that if b < b only
high-type mergers take place, whereas if b > b all mergers take place.
Consider now the other polar case in which there are large positive externalities.
Suppose that pioH(b) is such that qpi
o
H(b) + (1 − q)pi
A(b) > piH(b) − piT (b). In this case,
there always exist an asymmetric equilibrium in which at most one bidder submits a bid.
Intuitively, the condition ensures that if a bidder believes that the rival submits a bid (at
least if she is a high-type rival) and the reserve price is at least as high as the standalone
value of the target, then it is strictly better to stay an outsider rather than take the
target over. Indeed, the maximum rent that one can obtain by taking over the target
is still lower than the profits of being an outsider. If such an equilibrium is played for
30An alternative consistent belief of the potential acquirers is that their rival bids only if the reserve
price is such that the takeover is profitable for a high type, i.e if piH(b)−r ≥ piA(b) in which case the target
would set r = piH(b)−piA(b) and high-type acquirers would bid piH(b)−pioH(b) whenever r ≤ pi
H(b)−piA(b).
If rivals would hold this belief for all levels of the economic condition b, our comparative static result
below would be unaffected. With mixed strategies, one could construct even further consistent beliefs
and reserve prices but such equilibria seem implausible.
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all economic conditions, then obviously our results from the single bidder case carry over
unchanged. Despite the potential criticisms, such asymmetric equlibria might be more
reasonable than symmetric ones in this setting.31
Our analysis of externalities, however, does not cover a variety of intermediate cases
such as the case in which low efficiencies lead to positive and high efficiencies to negative
externalities. Such an analysis is cumbersome but we expect our analysis to carry over to
such cases under reasonable assumptions.
4.2 Cash or Share Deals
It might be that the outcome of the takeover process in our main model is inefficient. For
a range of parameters, the target sets a (separating) reserve price that is only accepted
by the high-type acquirers, despite the fact that all mergers are profitable.32 In this
case it is natural to ask whether better screening instruments might reduce or eliminate
information asymmetries and, therefore, the inefficiencies.
Suppose, for example, that full synergies can still be achieved, even if the target
shareholders keep a part of the newly merged entity. Acquirers, thus, can offer the target
shares in the newly merged firm, which is often observed in takeovers. This additional
buying option, in fact, allows the target to offer a menu of prices instead of a single
reserve price.33 Targets can set a low cash payment for those acquirers that leave it with
31As usual, one may criticize such asymmetric equilibria on the basis that they require coordination
between the bidders. In this particular case, however, it can be in the target’s interest to favor one buyer
over another in order to ensure that there is only one serious bidder. With positive externalities, if one
expects the rival to submit a bid, the value of submitting a bid is lower. This will tend to lower bids.
Worse, in symmetric equilibria for a wide range of reserve prices, bidders will only submit bids with
probability less than one, as shown by Inderst and Wey (2004) in a model with no uncertainty about
acquirers types.
32Formally, this range is equal to [bmin, b] if the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied. Let b˜ be
implicitly defined by piL(˜b) = 0. More generally, this range is equal to [max{bmin, b˜}, b] if Assumptions
(1) and (2) hold.
33When there is private information about synergy gains only, Brusco et al. (2007) find that an optimal
mechanism can be implemented by both merging firms dividing the shares of the new merger-entity, i.e.
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a subset of the shares in the new company and a higher cash payment—but lower than
the separating reserve price—for those acquirers who want to hold all the shares in the
new entity. The key intuition for why this is often optimal is that a high-type acquirer
is willing to pay more for owning the additional shares because he realizes that they will
be worth more to him. This allows a target that prefers to sell to both types to capture
some of the higher benefits if the acquirer is, indeed, a high type, which it cannot do
when setting a single reserve price. Observe also that the menu of prices has a natural
interpretation in practise: a low-type acquirer pays partly in shares, thereby allowing the
target to enjoy part of the future benefits of the merger, while a high-type acquirer pays
fully in cash, which gives it the right to 100% of the future earnings.
More formally, assume that an acquirer needs to control at least a fraction t ∈ (0, 1]
of the merged company to be able to realize the synergy gains. Although unnecessary for
our analysis, for simplicity we also assume that if indifferent between selling the entire
company or a share thereof, the target sells the entire company.34 This generalizes our
main model, which assumed that full ownership, t = 1, is necessary to achieve efficiencies.
As we show in the next proposition, though, this does not alter our comparative statics
results.
Proposition 6 Consider the optimal selling mechanism. If Assumptions (1) and (2) are
satisfied, there exist b̂(t) ∈ (b, b], such that if b < b, no merger takes place, if b < b < b̂(t),
only high-type mergers take place, and if b > b̂(t), all mergers take place. Furthermore,
b̂(1) = b and b̂(t) is decreasing in t.
a takeover fully paid with shares. Although this is efficient from the point of view of maximising the
entire surplus, however, it is not the best outcome for the target. Therefore, when the target has the
possibility to maximise its own expected surplus by setting a reserve price, it will not choose 100% shares
as payment.
34One can think of this assumption as formalizing the idea that there are small costs to joint ownership,
e.g. due to monitoring or coordination costs.
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5 Empirical predictions
In this section, we present the observational consequences (“predictions”) of our model,
and contrast ours with predictions from the existing theories. We furthermore discuss
how our predictions match empirical evidence.35
Prediction 1 Targets use defense tactics relatively more often during economic down-
turns, i.e. screen more, which lead to relatively more initiated mergers to be abandoned.
We know from Proposition (1) that for relatively bad economic conditions, the target
strictly prefers to set a separating reserve price—i.e. we would expect to see that relative
to the number of initiated mergers defense tactics are employed more often. From the
perspective of economic shock theories, it is unclear why targets would use defence tactics
relatively more often in downturns, since acquirers themselves would not initiate mergers
when they generate no economic surplus. Similarly, misvaluation theories predict that
acquirers themselves would not initiate mergers unless their stocks are overvalued, and
thus it is unclear why defense tactics should be employed relatively more often during
recessions.
Comment and Schwert (1995) show that defense tactics may lead a potential acquirer
to abandon a proposed merger. Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates that relatively more
initiated mergers are abandoned when economic conditions are worse. Our model, thus,
predicts a combination of these two empirical observations; defense tactics are employed
more often in economic downturns, leading to relatively more abandoned mergers.
Prediction 2 During economic booms, acquirers extract a larger share of the merger
surplus than during economic downturns. Targets, in contrast, extract a larger share in
economic downturns.
35Some empirical evidence is based on merger waves that coincide with periods of high stock markets
rather than economic booms. These stock market booms, however, are (highly) correlated with economic
booms as e.g. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) indicate. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that most
of the cited evidence is based on merger event studies, and we assume that the stock market reaction to
the event of the merger reveals the potential of the merger. As we explain in Footnote 8, however, event
studies may suffer from the fact that the merger-event might reveal other information.
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As shown in Proposition (1), the target sets a separating reserve price in downturns
and a pooling reserve price in booms. As a consequence, the acquirers earn, on average,
more rents during booms because the high-type bidders extract positive rents during
booms. In contrast, targets extract a higher share of the merger surplus during economic
downturns, since in this case they extract all the rents from the high-type acquirers. It is
unclear what existing theories would predict. In Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),
if there is only one (potential) bidder, the acquirer would extract all the surplus. With
multiple bidders, when there is more variance in valuations, the winning bidder should on
average receive a higher information rent; on the other hand if the average valuation of
bidders is relatively higher to that of the target, the targets benefits more from selling the
firm. Similarly, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) assume that technological shocks induce
higher ex-ante differences between firms. This may—or may not—lead to a higher share
of the surplus for the acquirers. On the other hand, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008)
claim that economic booms induce a higher assortive matching between merging firms.
Given that both merging firms are now more similar in terms of “quality”, this leads the
more efficient firms (the acquirer in our model) to extract a relatively smaller share of the
surplus.
There is evidence that in a merger wave—which coincides with economic upswings—
bidders gain, on average, higher abnormal returns than bidders outside waves. In a series
of announcement return regressions for bidders, Harford (2003) sets a dummy variable to
one for acquisitions made during waves and finds the dummy to be significantly positive
in all specifications. Gugler et al. (2006) find that, for tender offers, returns for wave-
acquirers in the month of the acquisition are higher than their non-wave counterparts.
Finally, Rosen (2006) discovers that bidder stock prices are more likely to increase when a
merger is announced in a “hot” merger market, i.e. in periods when mergers cluster. These
observations are in line with our theoretical predictions. To our knowledge, however, there
is no direct evidence on how much targets earn along the business cycle. Therefore, a
more direct test of our prediction would be analyzing whether the merger surplus between
acquirer and target is divided differently when economic conditions change.
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Prediction 3 The variance of the acquirers’ rents from mergers is higher in economic
upswings than in economic downturns.
For good economic conditions, both high- and low-type acquirers accept the reserve
price of the target. But, while the high-type acquirer earns positive rents, the low-type
acquirer does not. Therefore, the lack of screening makes that acquirers’ rents show more
variance.
Similar as in the first prediction, it is unclear what existing theories would predict.
Some of these theories assume that a higher ex-ante firm variance may trigger a merger
wave; a more efficient or more overvalued firm buys a less efficient or less overvalued firm.
These theories are unclear, however, how this translates into the variance of acquirers’
rents post-merger. Note also that in e.g. Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) theory, higher
ex-ante differences between firms lead to more merger-activity, while in our mechanism,
lower differences in the potential to realize synergy gains lead to more merger activity.36
There is some evidence that during merger waves—which coincide with economic
upswings—high-type acquirers gain more than low-type acquirers at the announcement
date.37 Carow et al. (2004) distinguish high- and low-type acquirers in a merger wave and
find that high types’ abnormal returns are significantly higher for different (short-term)
time windows.38 A more direct and general empirical test of this prediction would be
comparing economic booms and busts in terms of variability of earnings across acquirers
at the time of merging.
Prediction 4 During economic upswings, mergers are on average technologically less
efficient than during economic downturns.
36Although, due to the pooling of acquirers during booms, the variance of the successful acquirers is
still higher in booms than in downturns.
37Carow at al. (2004) define types by, among others, the timing of merging in a wave, industry
relatedness, and form of payment.
38Measured as industry-adjusted returns over the interval of days [−1, 1] around the announcement of
the acquisition, high types earn 4.42% more than low types in the wave and this difference is statistically
significant; over the longer interval [−5, 5] the difference is still 4.23%.
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For good economic conditions, both high- and low-type acquirers are accepted by the
target. This lack of screening induces the average quality of consummated mergers to be
lower when compared with bad economic conditions, where acquirers are screened such
that only high-type mergers occur. This prediction is in contrast with economic shock
theories, which predict that better economic conditions lead to more efficiency gains
from merging, e.g. due to economies of scale (Lambrecht, 2004) or more efficient firms
overturning less efficient firms (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). As discussed below, this
prediction may be shared by misvaluation theories.
A direct test of the above prediction would be to measure both pre- and post-merger
productivity and compare productivity differences between economic upswings and down-
turns. To our knowledge, this test has not yet been directly performed. Research has been
done on productivity differences due to merging (see e.g. McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995),
but no distinction has been made between economic cycles or high versus low merger
activity.39
One can indirectly relate this prediction with some existing empirical evidence related
to firms’ stock market performance in the long-run, given that we expect technologically
less efficient mergers to perform worse in the long term.40 Gugler et al. (2006) demonstrate
that, in the long term, wave mergers perform on average significantly worse than non-
wave mergers: The median abnormal return after three years is more than 11% lower
for wave-mergers. This is especially true for tender offers, where the difference becomes
34%. Harford (2003) shows the wave-dummy to be significantly negative for different
specifications in long-run bidder performance regressions. Also Rosen (2006) finds that
long-run returns are significantly lower for mergers announced in periods when the merger
39It must be added that Harford (2005) finds a positive effect for wave-mergers on expected long-term
performance. He, however, compares specialists’ forecasts right before and right after the merger. A
priori, though, specialists’ forecasts should be as positive as merging firms at the time of merging.
40A natural question to ask is why acquirers do not take this into account, and therefore do not refrain
from merging. One can extend our framework to account for the possibility that acquirers correctly foresee
that current boom periods may be followed by normal periods in the future. Given that payoffs of the
(distant) future are discounted, it is easy to argue that our mechanism still survives (see Banal-Estan˜ol
et al., 2006, for more details).
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market was booming. Furthermore, also consistent with our model, low-type mergers
during waves may be even less efficient than non-merging firms. Carow et al. (2004) find
out that the mean low-type mergers suffer a relative loss of more than 17% after three
years, with respect to non-merging firms in the same industry.
Prediction 5 Better economic conditions induce more acquirers to actively participate
in the bidding for a target.
When economic conditions are better, the target sets a pooling reserve price. As shown
in Section 4, this pooling reserve price induces an active bidding war if several high-type
acquirers are interested in the target. Indeed, a pooling reserve price is lower than the
willingness to pay for the participating high-types, who will raise their bids over the initial
reserve price. One would not observe bids in excess of the set (separating) reserve price,
i.e. during economic downturns. The separating reserve price is either too high (low-type
acquirer) or just about the right price (high-type) acquirer; both types have no incentive
to raise their bid above the reserve price. Existing theories have no clear prediction on
this issue, although it may be argued that when conditions for mergers become better,
more aquirers will bid for each target as long as the pool of potential targets is taken as
given. This is an easily testable prediction.41
One may also tentatively associate the findings in Proposition (6) on the optimal
selling mechanism with some observational statements. First, given the offered optimal
menu, low-type acquirers prefer to own only a part while high-type acquirers (weakly)
prefer to control the entire merged company. Therefore, a low-type prefers to pay partly
in shares while a high type prefers to pay in cash. When looking at empirical studies,
there is evidence consistent with this reasoning, shortly summarized in Shleifer and Vishny
(2003). Loughran and Vijh (1997) for example find that, for a sample of U.S. mergers in
the period 1970-1989, stock acquisitions earn a combined 5-year cumulative excess return
41Andrade at al. (2001) look at the average number of bids per decade (1973-1979, 1980-1989,1990-
1998), and find no real differences; however, they do not distinguish between periods according to eco-
nomic cycles or merger activity.
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of 14.5 percent, while for cash acquisitions the combined return is much higher at 90.1
percent.42
Second, given that our model predicts that during downturns only high-type mergers
will occur, we should see relatively more cash-financed mergers in these periods if the
target offers a menu of prices. There is again evidence consistent with this reasoning,
if one takes into account that high stock markets coincide with economic booms. For
example, casual observation by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggests that firms
tend to use relatively more stock as “acquisition currency” in the high merger activity
periods. Indeed, in the “low-activity” year 1990 the percentage of stock as a fraction of
total deal value was only 24%, while by 1998, the peak of the 90ties merger wave, the
use of stock rose to 68% of the total deal value. Andrade et al. (2001) confirm that the
preponderance of stock acquisitions is greater during high-valuation times.
These last predictions are shared by misvaluation theories. The reason offered by
misvaluation theories goes as follows: during times of high valuations over-valued acquirers
prefer to finance deals with stocks, and targets accept these offers. Our model, thus, offers
an alternative logic for these observations. Targets may use a menu of prices where high-
types prefer to pay in cash and low-types (partly) in shares, and deals with low-types are
more often observed during booms.
More generally, given that there is a high correlation between economic booms and
stock market booms, our theoretical predictions partly coincide with those of misvalu-
ation theories. In particular, since misvaluation theories predict that merger intensity
correlates with market misvaluation, wave-mergers are also predicted to be less efficient,
which coincides with our Prediction 4. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) find in an empirical
study evidence for misvaluation theories, but state that: “An alternative explanation [of
our empirical findings] is that aggregate merger intensity spikes when short-run growth
opportunities are high. However, the long-run growth opportunities go in the opposite
42Combined means that both the target and acquirer shareholders’ earnings are taken into account.
Interestingly, the same study also finds that cash tender acquirers earn an excess 70.3 percent, while stock
acquirers earn -24.0 percent. This observation is consistent with our model that predicts high-type (cash)
acquirers to gain more -or, which is the same, to pay relatively less- than low-type (stock) acquirers.
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direction; they are negatively associated with merger intensities.” This explanation is con-
sistent with our mechanism if one relates short-run growth opportunities with economic
conditions and long-term growth opportunities with a firm’s efficiency.
6 Conclusions
We constructed a model in which the target, by setting a binding reserve price, screens the
acquirer on the effectiveness of realizing synergy gains. We argued that favorable changes
in the economic environment tend to make efficiency gains relatively less important in
realizing merger profits, leading high-synergy mergers to be more similar to those that are
less fitting. We also showed that this would be predicted by most of the commonly used
horizontal and non-horizontal mergers models. Then, as economic conditions improve,
screening out relatively less-fitting acquirers becomes less desirable. Our mechanism,
thus, can explain how a positive change in economic fundamentals may generate a spike in
merger activity—in line with the observed procyclicality of merger waves. We furthermore
showed that our results still stand when several acquirers can bid for the target and when
targets use better screening devices by asking to be paid not only in cash but also partly
in shares of the newly merged firm.
Our screening explanation is not only consistent with a variety of stylized facts about
takeovers but also generates a number of novel testable predictions—all of which are based
targets’ incentives to screen more during economic downturns. Among these is the prog-
nosis that targets are more likely to rely on defense tactics when economic conditions are
relatively worse, which should lead to relatively more initiated mergers to be abandoned.
We further predict that targets extract a larger share of the merger surplus in economic
downturns than during economic booms, and that this relationship is inversed for acquir-
ers. As well, worse conditions induce less acquirers to actively participate in the bidding
for a target, given that the reserve price set by the target will then be relatively higher.
Similar to ours, other economic shock theories find pro-cyclical merger clustering.
Our screening model, however, differs from these models mainly on two accounts. First,
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our mechanism predicts that, even when all mergers are profitable, a target may screen
acquirers and thereby reject some profitable merger proposals. Second, in contrast to
other economic shock theories, our wave-mergers are on average less efficient. Given that
there is a high correlation between economic booms and stock market booms, however,
our prediction of less efficient wave-mergers coincides with those of misvaluation theories
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 2003 and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). In contrast
to the misvaluation theories, we do not rely on systematic stock market misvaluations—
even though our mechanism is consistent with them—to predict that wave mergers are
less efficient. Also, misvaluation theories make no clear predictions regarding the sharing
of the merger rents, the use of defense tactics, and the number of bidders for a given
target.
As most other models of merger waves, our theory is essentially non-strategic in the
sense that the desirability of a potential merger is unaffected by other takeovers. Our
merger wave is induced by an exogenous shift in the economic environment—an upward
shift in the market demand—that simultaneously changes all merger conditions and makes
screening by targets less desirable. While a dynamic takeover model is beyond the scope
of the current paper, strategic elements can be included in our setting. For example, if all
mergers take place in the same industry, screening may be less important in subsequent
mergers.43 We leave a full investigation of this question to future research.
43This effect would, for example, arise if high-type acquirers move early so that the probability of facing
a high-type acquirer, and therefore the benefit of screening, is lower in later mergers.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
The statement is a particular case of Proposition 6, which is shown below. The proof
follows if one takes t = 1 and, given that all mergers are profitable, b = bmin. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
The statement is a particular case of Proposition 6 in which t = 1. The proof thus follows
from the proof of Proposition 6 below. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
That Assumption (2) holds is established in the text. We are left to show that Assumption
(1) holds, i.e. that ∂
∂b
(
∆piE,H+∆piM
∆piE,L+∆piM
)
< 0. Differentiating, Assumption (1) is satisfied if
and only if
∂∆piE,H
∂b
∆piE,L−∆piE,H
∂∆piE,L
∂b
+(
∂∆piE,H
∂b
−
∂∆piE,L
∂b
)∆piM−
(
∆piE,H −∆piE,L
) ∂∆piM
∂b
< 0.
(2)
Condition (3b) implies that ∂∆pi
E,H
∂b
∆piE,L −∆piE,H ∂∆pi
E,L
∂b
≤ 0 and, since ∆piE,H > 0, this
is equivalent to
∂∆piE,H
∂b
∆piE,L
∆piE,H
≤
∂∆piE,L
∂b
.
Substituting this above and simplifying using that ∆piM > 0, the left hand side of in-
equality 2 is lower than or equal to
∂∆piE,H
∂b
∆piE,L−∆piE,H
∂∆piE,L
∂b
+
(
∆piE,H −∆piE,L
∆piE,H
)(
∆piM
∂∆piE,H
∂b
−∆piE,H
∂∆piM
∂b
)
.
This term is strictly lower than 0 if ∂
∂b
∆piE,H
∆piE,L
≤ 0 and ∂
∂b
∆piE,H
∆piM
≤ 0, with at least one of
these inequalities holding strictly. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
This statement follows from straightforward calculations shown in Appendix B. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote the net value of the merger to the acquirer as pˆiH(b) ≡ piH(b)− piA(b) if she has a
high type and as pˆiL(b) ≡ piH(b)− piA(b) is she has a low type. The target can set either
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(i) a reserve price, r ≤ pˆiL(b); (ii) r ∈ (pˆiL(b), pˆiH(b)]; or (iii) r > pˆiH(b). In case (i), the
reserve price is “pooling” rp, which now can also be strictly lower than the net gains of a
low type merger. Indeed, since bidders bid their net value, the revenue for the target in
this case is[
1− (1− q)n − n(1− q)n−1q
]
pˆiH(b) +
[
(1− q)n + n(1− q)n−1q
]
pˆiL(b).
That is, the target obtains the willingness to pay of a low-type acquirer whenever there
is at most one high-type acquirer and that of a high-type acquirer otherwise.
We now establish that within case (ii) it is always optimal to set the reserve price
at the upper limit of the interval, rs = pˆiH(b), denoted as a “separating” reserve price.
Observe that in this case the target’s expected profits are
(1− q)npiT (b) + n(1− q)n−1qr +
[
1− (1− q)n − n(1− q)n−1q
]
pˆiH(b),
which are strictly increasing in r. Finally, in case (iii) where the reserve price is “pro-
hibitive”, r > pˆiH(b), the target’s profits are piT (b) since no bidder is willing to submit a
bid.
Clearly, a prohibitive reserve price is suboptimal if and only if a high-type merger is
profitable (i.e. pˆiH(b) > piT (b) or ∆piH(b) > 0) in which case the target strictly prefers a
separating reserve price to a prohibitive one. By Assumption (2), there exists a unique
b ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that for all b < b, ∆pi
H(b) < 0. Thus for such b a prohibiting reserve
price is optimal and, hence, no merger takes place.
Supposing that a high-type merger is profitable (b > b), the target prefers a separating
reserve price rs to a pooling reserve price rp whenever
(1− (1− q)n) pˆiH(b) + (1− q)npiT (b)
≥
[
1− (1− q)n − n(1− q)n−1q
]
pˆiH(b) +
[
(1− q)n + n(1− q)n−1q
]
pˆiL(b),
which is equivalent to
nq∆piH(b) ≥ [1− q + nq] ∆piL(b).
Hence, a separating reserve price is preferred if (i) ∆piL(b) ≤ 0 or if (ii) ∆piL(b) > 0 and
∆piH(b)
∆piL(b)
>
1− q + nq
nq
. (3)
If ∆piL(b) ≤ 0 for all b then b = bmax. If, instead, there exists b
∗ such that ∆piL(b∗) > 0
then, by Assumption (1), for any b > b∗, ∆piL(b) > 0. Again, by Assumption (1), there
exists a unique b ∈ [b, bmax] such that if b < b < b the target strictly prefers a separating
reserve price and if b > b the target strictly prefers a pooling reserve price. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary
It follows from the proof of Proposition 4 that b and b(n) are defined as stated in the
Corollary. Since
1− q + nq
nq
is decreasing in the number of bidders n, Assumption 1 implies that b(n) is increasing in
n. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since mergers are profitable the target will always want to sell the firm so a prohibitive
reserve price is suboptimal. Suppose now a target set a non-binding or pooling reserve
price. As established in the text, if the target sets a pooling reserve price, a high type
bidder will submit a bid equal to piH(b) − pioH(b) and a low type bidder a bid equal to
piL(b)− pioL(b). As a result the profits for the target are
q2[piH(b)− pioH(b)] + (1− q
2)[piL(b)− pioL(b)],
which using among other things that piH(b) = b [piH(b)−R] +R can be rewritten as
(b− 1)R + bq2[piH(1)− pioH(1)] + (1− q
2)[pi1(b)− pioL(1)].
As extablished in the text, the optimal separating reserve price is
rs = q[piH(b)− pioH(b)] + (1− q)[pi
H(b)− piA(b)].
and the target’s profits when setting such a reserve price are
(1− q)2piT (b) + 2q(1− q)rs + q2[piH(b)− pioH(b)].
Substituting and rewriting, the target prefers a pooling reserve price to a separating
reserve price if and only if
(1− q2)[piL(1)− pioL(1)] +
b− 1
b
R(1− q)2 ≥ (1− q)2piT (1) + 2q(1− q)φ,
where φ = q[piH(1) − pioH(1)] + (1 − q)[pi
H(1) − piA(1)]. Since the left hand side of the
above inequality is increasing in the economic condition b, there exists a critical level of
the economic condition above which the target prefers a pooling reserve price and below
which it prefers a separating reserve price. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6
We will now look for the optimal selling mechanism in this case. To do so, we restate our
problem in contract-theoretic terms. Let {sl, rl} denote a an ownership share sl ∈ [0, 1]
and a price rl for this ownership share.
By the revelation principle, we can restrict attention to mechanisms in which acquirers
truthfully reveal their type. At the optimal solution, the target either does not sell the
firm to either type (i.e. sets a prohibitive reserve price r∞), sells to high-type acquirers
only (i.e sets a separating reserve price rs), or sells to both high and low-type acquirers.
Below, we suppress the dependence of profits on the economic condition b wherever
convenient. Suppose first that at the optimal solution the target sells the firm to both
low- and high-type acquirers. Then target chooses a menu {sH , rH , sL, rL} that solves
max
sH ,rH ,sL,rL
q{rH + (1− sH)piH}+ (1− q){rL + (1− sL)piL} (4)
s.t sHpiH − rH ≥ piA, (PCH)
sLpiL − rL ≥ piA, (PCL)
sHpiH − rH ≥ sLpiH − rL, (ICH)
sLpiL − rL ≥ sHpiL − rH , (ICL)
sH ≥ t, sL ≥ t
Following the usual approach, we solve the relaxed problem in which the constraint ICL
is ignored and show that the optimal solution satisfies ICL. Observe that PCL and ICH
imply PCH . Hence, we can ignore PCH . Furthermore, PCL must hold with equality for
otherwise we could increase rL and thereby increase the objective function and relax ICH .
Since PCL and ICH hold with equality, we have
rL = sLpiL − piA,
rH = sHpiH − piA − sL(piH − piL).
Substituting these into the objective function, the target’ problem is
max
sL
q{piH − piA − sL(piH − piL)}+ (1− q){piL − piA}
s.t. sL ≥ t.
Hence, at the optimum sL = t and rL = tpiL− piA. Formally, the optimal sH is indetermi-
nate because the target is indifferent between selling extra shares above the critical level t
at a marginal price of piH to a a high type-acquirer or keeping them themselves and earn-
ing piH for these shares. But at an optimal solution rH = sHpiH−piA−sL(piH−piL) so that
of the target chooses to sell only t shares to high-type acquirers then rH would be equal
to rL while if it sells all shares, then rH = piH(1− t)+ tpiL−piA. For ease of exposition, we
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select the latter solution. Observe that the solution also satisfies ICL justifying the choice
of solving the relaxed problem. We refer to this {1, piH(1− t) + tpiL − piA, t, tpiL − piA} as
the optimal low-type-accommodating menu.
Suppose now that the target sells only to high-type acquirers at the optimal solution.
Then the high-type participation constraint must be satisfied with equality so that rH =
sHpiH − piA and the target’s profits if it sells only to high-type acquirers are q{rH + (1−
sH)}+(1− q)piT = q(piH − piA)+ (1− q)piT . Again we select the solution in which sH = 1
and refer to the price as the separating reserve price rs ≡ piH − piA.
The target strictly prefers the separating over the prohibiting reserve price if and only
if
q(piH(b)− piA(b)) + (1− q)piT (b) > piT (b),
which is equivalent to
∆piH(b) > 0.
By Assumption (2), there exists a unique b ∈ [bmin, bmax] such that if b < b the target
strictly prefers r∞(b) and if b > b the target strictly prefers rs(b). Similarly the target
strictly prefers the pooling over the prohibiting reserve price if and only if
q
[
piH(b)− piA(b)− t(piH(b)− piL(b))
]
+ (1− q)
(
piL(b)− piA(b)
)
> piT (b),
which is equivalent to
q(1− t)∆piH(b) + [1− q(1− t)]∆piL(b) > 0.
Since, trivially, ∆piH(b) > ∆piL(b) the optimal reserve price is prohibitive if b < b and if
b > b the optimal reserve price is either separating or pooling. Notice that if b = bmax the
target always prefer the prohibiting reserve price and therefore b̂ = bmax. Suppose from
now on that b < bmax and b > b.
Observe that the separating reserve price is strictly preferred to the optimal low-type-
accommodating menu if and only if
q(piH(b)−piA(b))+(1−q)piT (b) > q
[
piH(b)− piA(b)− t(piH(b)− piL(b))
]
+(1−q)
(
piL(b)− piA(b)
)
,
which is equivalent to
tg∆piH(b) > ∆piL(b)[1− q + qt].
Hence, a separating reserve price is preferred if (i) ∆piL(b) ≤ 0 or if (ii) ∆piL(b) > 0 and
∆piH(b)
∆piL(b)
>
1− q + qt
qt
. (5)
If ∆piL(b) ≤ 0 for all b then b̂ = bmax. If, instead, there exists b
∗ such that ∆piL(b∗) > 0
then, by Assumption (1), for any b > b∗ we have that ∆piL(b) > 0. Again, by Assumption
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(1), there exists a unique b̂ ∈ [b, bmax] such that if b < b < b̂ the target strictly prefers a
separating reserve price and if b > b̂ the target strictly prefers a pooling reserve price.
Since b̂ depends on t, we from now on write b̂(t). Given that the right hand side of
(5) is decreasing in t, we have that b̂(t) is (weakly) decreasing in t. Denoting b ≡ b̂(1) we
have that b ≤ b̂(t) ≤ b for any t. Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Example 1: Bertrand with differentiated goods
Condition (3a) is satisfied as shown in Lemma 5.2 (page 256) of Motta (2004). We next
show that Condition (3b) holds. Suppose the merging firms are able to operate at a
unit cost ec and rewrite the per-product profit of the merged firm following Motta (2004)
(equation 5.40) as
α
(
cµ(e) + vε
β
)2
,
where α = n + (n − 2)γ, β = 2n2((n − 2)γ2 + 3(n − 1)γ + 2n, µ(e) = (1 − e)(2 − 3n +
n2)γ2 + n(n− 2− 3e(n− 1))γ − 2en2 and ε = n(2n+ (2n− 1)γ). (Above, we correct for
a small typo in Motta.) Substituting e for eH , eL and 1, yields the merging profits for
the high- and low-type acquirers and the hypothetical profits if there were no efficiency
gains. Using these profits one can rewrite the following ratio as
∆piE,H
∆piE,L
=
µ(eH)− µ(1)
µ(eL)− µ(1)
c[µ(eH) + µ(1)] + 2vε
c[µ(eL) + µ(1)] + 2vε
.
Using n ≥ 2, µ(e) is strictly decreasing in e. In addition, eH < eL < 1 and hence
µ(eH) > µ(eL) > µ(1). As a result the first ratio of the previous equation is positive and
the derivative of the second ratio with respect to the market size v is negative. Therefore,
Condition (3b) is satisfied strictly.
We are left to establish that Condition (3c) is satisfied. Using equations (5.28) and
(5.33) in Motta (2004), one has ∆piM = ϕ(v − c)2 where
ϕ ≡
(n+ (n− 2)γ) ((2n− 1) γ + 2n)2
4n2 ((n− 2)γ2 + 3(n− 1)γ + 2n)2
−
(n+ nγ − γ)
(2n+ nγ − γ)2
.
Since merging is profitable, we have that ϕ > 0. Now, we have that
∆piE,H
∆piM
=
α
β2
(cµ(eH) + vε)
2 − (cµ(1) + vε)2
ϕ(v − c)2
,
which can be rewritten as
∆piE,H
∆piM
=
α
β2
c[cµ(eH) + cµ(1) + 2vε][µ(eH)− µ(1)]
ϕ(v − c)2
.
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Since ϕ > 0, c > 0, and α > 0, and µ(eH)− µ(1) > 0, the derivative with respect to the
market size υ has the same sign as the derivative of
cµ(eH) + cµ(1) + 2vε
(v − c)2
,
which in turn has the same sign as −(cµ(eH) + cµ(1) + ε (υ + c)). Using that µ(1) =
−ε = 0, this simplifies to −(cµ(eH) + ευ). Therefore the derivative is negative, and hence
Condition (3c) holds strictly.
Example 6: Multiplicative demand and synergies
The example trivially satisfies (3a). One has,
∆piE,H(b)
∆piE,L(b)
=
∆piH(S)−∆piM(S)
∆piL(S)−∆piM(S)
,
which is independent the market size S and hence (3b) holds weakly. Using that
∆piE,H(b)
∆piM(b)
=
S(∆piH(S)−∆piM(S))
S(∆piM(S)) +R)−R
=
∆piH(S)−∆piM(S)
∆piM(S) +R− R
S
,
(3c) holds strictly if the above is decreasing in S, i.e. if ∆piH(S) > ∆piM(S) or piH(S) >
piN(S). Thus Condition (3c) is satisfied with a strict inequality.
Example 2: Conjectural variations model
Substituting in equation (3) in Boone (2000) we have that the profits of any firm i in a
market of m firms are equal to
(1 + V )
(
(1 + V )M − (m+ 1 + V )ci +
∑n
j=1 cj
(m+ 1 + V ) (1 + V )
)2
,
where V is the conjectural variation, V = 0 is Cournot and m is the number of firms. If
we take m = n − 1 firms (there has been a merger) and cj = c for the rest of the firms,
we have that the profits of the merged firm are
(1 + V )
(
(1 + V )M − (n− 1 + V )ci + (n− 2)c
(n+ V ) (1 + V )
)2
Substituting ci for c and c, in the numerator and in the denominator and simplifying we
have that
∆piE,H
∆piE,L
=
[2(1 + V ) (M − c) + (n− 1 + V ) (c− c)] (c− c)
[2(1 + V ) (M − c) + (n− 1 + V ) (c− c)] (c− c)
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and therefore the derivative is negative.
In order to show part (3c) we can again substract the profits of two firms in a market
of m = n firms from the profits of one firm in a market with m = n − 1 for the case in
which all production costs are equal to c and simplifying
∆piM =
(M − c)2 (1 + V )
(n+ 1 + V )2 (n+ V )2
[
1 + 2(n+ V )− (n+ V )2
]
Notice that a merger without efficiencies is profitable if and only if 1+2(n+V )−(n+ V )2 >
0.
Suppose from now on that 1 + 2(n + V ) − (n+ V )2 > 0. In this case, condition (3c)
is satisfied since
sign
(
∂
∂M
∆piE,H
∆piM
)
= sign
∂
∂M
[2(1 + V ) (M − c) + (n− 1 + V ) (c− c)]
(M − c)2
,
which is negative.
For future reference, notice that in case 1 + 2(n + V ) − (n+ V )2 < 0, not only is a
merger for market power unprofitable (Condition (3a) is violated) but also Condition (3c)
does not hold.
Example 3: Cournot counterexample
In the proof of the conjectural variations example, we have shown that if the merger for
market power is unprofitable then it does not satisfy Condition (3c) either although it
satisfies Condition (3b) of the corollary. An example in which the merger is unprofitable
is the Cournot case (V = 0) with three firms (n = 3). We now show that Assumption (1)
does not hold either. Assume for simplicity that c < c < c. Substituting from above
∆piH
∆piL
=
∆piE,H −∆piM
∆piE,L −∆piM
=
8(M + c− 2c)2 − 9(M − c)2
8(M + c− 2c)2 − 9(M − c)2
which simplifying is equal to
∆piH
∆piL
=
32 [c− c]2 + 32(M − c) [c− c]− (M − c)2
32 [c− c]2 + 32(M − c) [c− c]− (M − c)2
.
Defining x ≡ (M − c) and the appropriate constants, the previous expression can be
rewritten as
∆piH
∆piL
= f(x) ≡
k1 + k2x− x
2
k3 + k4x− x2
We now show that the sign of f ′(x) is equal to the sign of x2 + [c− c+ c− c]x −
32 [c− c] [c− c], which is clearly negative if x = (M − c) = 0 but then increases and
it is positive for a high enough x. Therefore, Assumption (1) is violated.
43
Now, f ′(x) has the same sign as
k2k3 − k1k4 + 2x(k1 − k3) + x
2 (k2 − k4) ,
which, substituting, has the same sign as the polynomial above.
Examples 4 and 5: Differentiated/Convex Cournot
The example trivially satisfies (3a). We now establish that it satisfies Conditions (3b)
and (3c). The net profits from merging are given by
(4 + λ) [(b− cm)(1 + λ) + (c− cm)(n− 2)]
2
S(n, λ)2
−
(b− c)2 (2 + λ)
(n+ λ+ 1)2
where
S(n, λ) ≡ (4 + λ)(1 + λ) + (n− 2)(2 + λ).
Substituting cm for c we have that without efficiency gains merger is profitable (there are
market power gains), ∆piM > 0, if and only if
T (n, λ) ≡ (1 + λ)2(4 + λ)(n+ λ+ 1)2 − (2 + λ)S(n, λ)2 > 0.
Substituting cm for c, c and c, we have that
∆piE,H
∆piE,L
=
∆piH −∆piM
∆piL −∆piM
=
[(2b− c− c)(1 + λ) + (c− c)(n− 2)] (c− c)
[(2b− c− c)(1 + λ) + (c− c)(n− 2)] (c− c)
,
and therefore the derivative with respect to the market size is equal to
∂
∂b
∆piE,H
∆piE,L
= −
(1 + λ)2 (c− c) (c− c) (n+ λ+ 1)
[(2b− c− c)(1 + λ) + (c− c)(n− 2)]2 (c− c)
≤ 0
given that c < c¯ < c.
Similarly, substituting cm for c, c and c, we have that
∆piE,H
∆piM
=
[(b− c)(1 + λ) + (c− c)(n− 2)] (4 + λ) (c− c) (n+ λ+ 1)2(n+ λ− 1)
(b− c)2T (n, λ)
,
and therefore the derivative with respect to the market size is equal to
∂
∂b
∆piE,H
∆piM
= −
2 [(b− c)(1 + λ) + (c− c)(n− 2)] (4 + λ) (c− c) (n+ λ+ 1)2(n+ λ− 1)
(b− c)3T (n, λ)
≤ 0
given that c < c¯ < c < b.
44
Example 7: Conglomerate merger
The net profits from merging are given by
∆pi∗m(cm) = 2
(
(β − cm)
2
4a
−
(β − c)2
4a
)
−R.
Taking the first derivative with respect to β of a high-type firm and simplifying, one has
∂ (∆pi∗m(c))
∂b
=
c− c
a
> 0,
and thus Assumption (2) holds since c > c. Taking the derivative with respect to β of
the following equation
∆pi∗m(c)
∆pi∗m(c)
=
(β − c)2 − (β − c)2 − 2aR
(β − c)2 − (β − c)2 − 2aR
establishes that Assumption (1) holds.
Example 8: Vertical merger
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